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In response to the topic to be addressed, I’d like to touch on three broad areas.
First, the why of NATO enlargement and the specific benefits the U.S. sees; second,
a number of post-Madrid issues, or post-enlargement issues ( what are going to be the
key questions that each member of the Alliance is going to have to face); and third,
provide a brief overview of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and some of its key
provisions.
So, first to the why of NATO enlargement as far as the U.S. is concerned. The U.S.
sees the great opportunity for democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe fomented
by enlargement. The opportunity to join NATO clearly has served as an impetus for
democratic change in a number of countries, specifically for greater civilian control over
the military, greater parliamentary oversight, and the creation of transparent political
processes. I believe this can be seen in new countries like Slovenia, where there are
wonderful opportunities to build a new government from the ground up. It can be seen
very clearly in countries like Poland, about which, up until three or four months ago,
there were very deep concerns in the West concerning democratic control of the military.
I think it’s quite clear that as a direct result of western criticism over the way Poland was
conducting its military affairs, the Polish government took very important steps to reform
the defense bureaucracy and firmly establish civilian control over the military. 
Second, it’s clear that enlargement brings a stronger collective defense and ability
to address new security challenges. Though it is a cliché that the Cold War is over, we
also know that, as our troops in Bosnia make very clear, defense issues do remain still
for Europe and the United States to address. And despite being at the far end of the
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conflict spectrum, the Gulf War again demonstrated that there are also places outside of
Europe where the United States and Europe can act together in defense of their interests. 
The third issue is very clearly more than just on the horizon: I believe it is here
today. And that is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the Defense
Minister Serra mentioned earlier. I think it’s a very important issue for Europe partly
because it is not an issue which develops over time; rather because it’s an issue where
the technical development can move very quickly based upon the import of technologies
and the delivery of missile systems. The enlargement process here brings a larger circle
of like-minded states together to make contributions on collective security and collective
defense. And such cooperation can be seen elsewhere, also; for example, in Bosnia where
NATO plus all of the Partnership for Peace countries are there making contributions
together. These are contributions in terms of energetic forces with specialized capabilities
that, in many cases, the countries developed which were not widely prevalent in NATO
forces. And here I’m referring to certain kinds of civil affairs units and chemical defense
units. As you can see, then, countries outside of NATO are truly bringing important
contributions to NATO and the security of Europe. 
Fourth, a benefit of enlargement is improved relations among states. NATO’s lasting
legacy for Europe, I would submit, is its role as a peace promoter and a peace manager.
It has really served that function, dare I say, even better that it did in deterring outside
threats. I say ‘served better’ because that function is, as I’ve said, part of the lasting legacy
which still holds true today. For example, the potential for joining NATO has brought
a number of countries, or spurred a number of countries, to settle disputes. Notably,
Poland and Lithuania have signed an agreement clarifying their border, as have other
countries as well: Hungary and Slovakia; Poland and Ukraine; Hungary and Romania.
In each case, long-standing sores between nations have been given a lot of high level
political attention in order to solve these issues and create acceptable decisions for these
countries very much, I think, under pressure to clean up their international relations to
make them more viable members of the West and,in particular, NATO.
Fifth, plenoprosperity. When these countries join NATO, they will have a more
stable climate for investment and economic reform. If I were a large investor, I would
certainly think about putting money into any of these countries coming into NATO,
because clearly their investment risk is going to go down. Indeed, more countries and
companies are going to be willing to put money into countries that are part of NATO
thanks to the security guarantees that the Alliance supposes. And, clearly, those
investments will be a boost to their chances for wider integration with the West. 
Last, there is a great benefit to broader European stability from the enlargement
of NATO. As I said before, democratic change in states, better relations with neighbors,
and prosperity all equate to greater European stability. Historically, when Central and
Eastern Europe were unstable, Europe had a penchant for instability. For the U.S., at
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least, all of these reasons taken together add up to a very compelling argument for why
the United States has been a very strong proponent for the enlargement of NATO. 
I think it’s also because these arguments really go across the board without reference
to particular countries. There is probably nobody currently who could give you a definitive
answer on who exactly is going to join or be asked to join in Madrid. But clearly, though,
regardless of the specifics as to which countries are asked to join, there will be, as I’ve
indicated, substantial benefits for Western Europe and for European security. 
Now, there are going to be several issues that come up after Madrid. There are,
shall we say, several challenges which will need to be addressed, whoever is invited. 
First, there will be the action of parliaments and congresses. There will have to be
fundamental questions asked, which I assume will be asked if not in all countries, in
most. Yes, the immediate threat to European security is low (I say ‘immediate’ meaning
today, tomorrow, and to the few years in the future); but, clearly the fundamentals of
joining NATO are two-folded and linked. One question is whether the present members
of NATO will have a willingness to spend and to defend these new states; that is, whether
a new country is willing to join and defend the current members and all the other
members who would join. The other question is whether the current members are willing
to put their troops on the line for your country. The latter is basic: It brings to fore the
fundamental component of NATO - the common defense of allies, which is the
component which separates NATO from other security institutions in Europe. And as
such it will be key issue for parliaments and congresses to decide. 
Second, these new countries are going to have to be producers of security and not
just consumers. Though they have ( as I said before) made contributions, for example
in Bosnia, clearly, these activities are going to have to be more regularized. These
countries will have to make clear their willingness to join common tasks and will have
to have a more thorough reform of their military structures to make them more
compatible with, and more easily able to work with, the rest of NATO. There will be
some costs involved in that to those countries; still, this brings up another fundamental
requirement of anyone who joins NATO. And that is that members must contribute
to the common good. Members do not just drain-off, if you will, security.
Third, and I think highly important for the debates leading up to Madrid and
afterwards, is the fact that NATO must remain open. NATO’s Article 10 makes clear
that it is an open organization, and NATO has got to remain open to further accession.
All of the elements I listed that were benefits from NATO enlargement rest
fundamentally on the benefits that accrue from the steps states are willing to take in
order to make themselves ready and attractive to join NATO.  Should NATO wish to
maintain that process of democratic change and economical reform, NATO has to
make clear that it is willing to take in new countries after the first draw. Important to
remember is that the overall goal of the enlargement and NATO security policy is an
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undivided Europe. And if it is not clear that NATO remains open, I believe that goal
comes into jeopardy. So, the handling of this question will be a key issue for Madrid
and for the post-Madrid discussions. 
The fourth challenge after Madrid is very clear (it was touched on in the
introduction), and that is the relationship with Russia. I don’t think that the United
States puts too much emphasis on this issue given the great influence that Russia has
historically (and not just since 1945) had on the development of European politics.
Russia continues to be the largest player on the continent. It is a country going through
profound economic and political change. It is country which has lost much of its
previous self-identity and is searching for a new self-identity. In view of this, I think
any steps that NATO can take, or that countries can take bilaterally, to build a
relationship with Russia will be steps towards greater development of stability in Europe. 
Briefly now, let me turn to the elements of the Russia-NATO Founding Act,
which was signed on May 14th by Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister
Primakov. (The full title is, by the way, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.) The act
contains five basic principles, plus a preamble in which it is made clear that neither
NATO nor Russia considers each other an adversary; and, although this is an important
point that NATO made very clear at the end of the Cold War, it is the first time that
NATO and Russia have both articulated this non-adversarial position. 
The first section lays out the principles governing the relationship of states based
upon international norms such as the UN and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, in which
there are explicit commitments to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
states — particularly important issues given NATO’s enlargement. 
The second section creates a new forum called the Permanent Joint Council.
This is an extremely important group comprised of 17 countries (NATO 16 plus
Russia). The Council would obviously expand after Madrid, after countries are formally
brought into the alliance, which would most likely be in 1999. But, as it stands now,
the Council is the permanent forum in which NATO and Russia will consult.  Section
three describes a very large range of issues for NATO and Russia to discuss; for example,
conflict prevention, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development
of security strategies. 
Section four was probably the most controversial and the most delicate to negotiate;
and, I think a lot of credit devolves to Secretary Solana for bringing about the accords.
This is the military dimension of the relationship. The key provisions of it are a re-
duration of NATO’s nuclear statement of December of 1996: that NATO has no
intention, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new countries.
This section contains a reference to NATO’s statement on how it would intend to carry
out collective defense through interoperability, integration and reinforcement. A key
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provision here is that NATO does not intend to station substantial combat forces in
new countries. There was a recognition in this section that NATO will require adequate
infrastructure on the territory of new members as part of its strategy of reinforcement.
Also mentioned is NATO’s and Russia’s commitment to prompt adoption of the CFE
Treaty, which is an important provision because that is a legally binding instrument by
which Russia and NATO can negotiate security in Europe.
Finally, there’s the clear articulation that NATO retains its full prerogatives: As
President Clinton said, “Russia will work with NATO, but not within NATO”. In
sum, the NATO-Russia relationship reflected in the Founding Act offers Russia many
opportunities for consultation, rewards for constructive engagement, and even joint
action should there be a consensus. Should Russia wish to take what we hope is a very
constructive, a very positive approach to European security, there are many ways to
pursue it through the Permanent Joint Council. But, again, the Founding Act clearly
does not offer Russia a veto should it choose otherwise.
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